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Abstract 
An important objective for digital platform governance is to ensure the creation of 
high-quality complements. For nascent platforms, complements are typically the main 
force in attracting early adopters and, consequently, further improving platform’s 
attractiveness to potential complementors. In this research-in-progress paper, we study 
seeding – direct financial support to selected complements by the platform owner – as 
an indirect governance mechanism in motivating the complement quality improvement 
in general. The dataset consists of 499 connected home complements on Amazon’s 
Alexa platform that were released during the first three years after the platform launch. 
The preliminary findings reveal that complements launched after platform owner’s 
seeding actions generally show better quality. Such a quality improvement effect seems 
to be reinforced if the platform owner can conduct repetitive seeding on the same 
complement. However, the effectiveness of repetitive seeding may vary depending on 
the investment and the maturity of the target complement’s business.  
Keywords: Digital platform, Platform strategy and governance, Connected Home 
complements 
 
Introduction 
Complement quality is an important concern for digital platforms particularly at the nascent stage of 
their development. Soon after the platform launch, various complements (e.g. Google actions) take a 
pivotal role in demonstrating the specific features and utilities of platform (e.g. Google Home) to its 
intended users (Verdegem and De Marez, 2011; Wareham et al. 2014). The usefulness and quality of 
complements significantly account for consumers’ overall evaluation on the platform’s popularity. A 
perceived platform popularity can, in turn, support the platform’s sustained growth by attracting more 
capable developers to contribute (Evans & Schmalensee, 2010). Therefore, to boost platform’s growth, 
promoting high-quality complements is an important task to platform owners.  
However, the modularized platform architecture entails that the platform owner can only deploy arm’s-
length control over complementors and the quality of their products (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Apart 
from restricting complementors’ behaviour through some formal mechanisms such as participation 
rules, and platform boundary resources (Tiwana, 2010; Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2012), platform 
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owners can also use more indirect techniques that encourage desired high-quality contributions from 
complementors (Tiwana, 2015). Different from formal controls which often apply at the level of the 
entire platform ecosystem (Gulati et al. 2012; McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017), indirect governance 
mechanisms entail more flexibility regarding the scale at which they target complementor, the ease of 
duplication and modification of the measures, and the possibility for swift reversion if environment 
changes.  
Seeding, defined as the platform owner’s financial sponsorship given to selected complements, is one 
such indirect governance mechanisms. Suggested by Parker (2016), relying on a small number of 
capable complementors can be an effective way to introduce a platform and its benefits to potential 
customers. While, platform owners should bear in mind that both their action and outcomes of seeding 
would address far reaching impact on performance of later-joined complements. On the one hand, the 
complements that are seeded by a platform owner will be perceived by other complementors as the 
source of benchmarking (Parker, 2016). As a result, complementors who wish to catch attention and 
surpass those seeded complements must face the race and bring about better performance (Foerderer et 
al, 2018; Barnett and Pontikes, 2008). On the other hand, the platform owner’s exclusive sponsorship 
designated to a few complements may potentially discourage novel contribution, because the cost of 
succeeding in the competition increases due to initial advantage given to a few seeded players (Gawer 
and Henderson, 2007; Foerderer et al, 2018). Also, a complementary market where platform owner is 
involved may signal a threat that most of the profits will flow to a selected few due to their access to 
insider secrets (Choi and Stefanadis, 2001; Ceccagnoli et al, 2012). 
To shed light on how seeding works as a platform governance mechanism, we investigate the following 
question: 
 
How does ‘seeding’ as an indirect governance mechanism used by nascent platforms’ owners 
influence the quality of complements in general? 
 
We use a dataset consisting of 499 Connected Home complements on Amazon’s Alexa platform from 
2015 to 2018. Based on multiple linear regression with a number of controls, the preliminary findings 
reveal that complements launched after platform seeding generally display higher quality. Moreover, 
the quality-increasing effect seems to be reinforced if a platform owner conducts repetitive seeding on 
the same target complement, depending on the intensity of financial sponsorship as well as the maturity 
of the seeded complement’s business. We also discuss plans to further extend and improve the 
robustness of the findings.  
 
Theoretical background 
Complement quality in nascent platforms  
Encouraging external developers’ creation of novelty whilst ensuring adequate quality is a central task 
to the owners of most nascent platforms (Tiwana, 2015). The utility and usefulness of complements 
significantly affect the potential users’ evaluation of the platform. To this regard, the platform’s 
attractiveness to consumers is not under the platform owners’ sole control but circuitously depends on 
the performance of the complements (Fukuyama, 2013). For a nascent platform, it is often important to 
quickly lock in an increasing base of users by offering relevant complementary services, as the 
platform’s popularity accumulated at the early stage can, in turn, determine how lucrative the platform 
is to the latter complementors. Essentially, consumers and complementors gained at the early stage 
make far-reaching influence on platform’s growth in the long run.  
The complement’s quality is reflected in users’ overall evaluation of the complement’s innovation value 
(Cennamo 2018). Manifestations of such subjective assessment can be, for instance, customer rating 
score, customer reviews, and the price set by the complementor (Foerderer et al. 2018). To this regard, 
to improve complement’s quality equally means to improve multiple components that are 
(un)consciously counted in customers’ evaluation procedure. Therefore, these influential components 
form a group of critical controls that should be included in our analysis. Adapted from Claussen et al 
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(2015), Tiwana (2018), and Cennamo et al (2018), three main groups of quality’s determinants are 
included:  
1) The complement’s features. The most visible indication of quality to the users is a number of features 
in terms of different functional dimensions such as languages supported, interface design, the variety 
of uses achieved, and the number of peripheral extensions enabled. 2) The External Coupling. It 
indicates the extent to which the complement is architecturally coupled to the platform’s core 
technology. The lower the external coupling, the quicker a complement can plug in new features without 
having to reconfigure its connections with the platform’s core. 3) The Internal Coupling. It describes 
the internal interdependence among multiple modules of the complement. The internal coupling implies 
the variety of services that a complement can offer (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). The higher internal 
coupling usually means the complement has integrated more types of services.  
Seeding as a strategy to increase complement quality 
Seeding – the platform owner’s financial assistance given to selected complements – has particular 
importance to newly established digital platforms (Huber et al. 2017). When consumers are the main 
force behind platform growth, an important way to convince them about the platform’s unique value is 
to enable real user experience through high-quality complementary services. However, the platform’s 
core product may entail huge technological differences from the complementary products, which makes 
it quite difficult for the platform owners to simultaneously concentrate on developing both platform’s 
core product and complements. Therefore, instead of in-house development from scratch, the platform 
owners would rather rely on partnerships to create the initial complementary value units (Parker and 
Van Alstyne 2016; Dellermann & Reck 2017).  
As a governance mechanism that directly targets only few of the platform’s complements, the impact 
of seeding must be understood beyond simple financial support (Boudreau, 2010; Wareham et al. 2014). 
First, as suggested by Parker (2016), supporting selected complements implicitly convey the expected 
quality that platform owners want to see from the following-joined complements. Benchmarking 
themselves against the seeded complements, the non-seeded complements tend to show subsequent 
superior performance to maintain the market position against unequal competition (Derfus et al., 2008). 
Second, the financial investment manifests platform owners’ commitment to the complementary 
services market. This, in turn, can reduce complementors’ perceived uncertainty regarding the new 
technology and thus induce more autonomous contributions (Goldback et al., 2014; Dellermann and 
Reck, 2017). Lastly, the platform owners’ presence in the complementary market draws attention from 
the demand-side (Foerderer et al, 2018). The increased amount of user feedback from such attention 
can result in spillover benefits to all complementors through enhanced innovation efficiency and 
enlarged consumer base (Sahni, 2016). Therefore, the first hypothesis we have is: 
 
H (1): Complements that launch after the platform’s seeding actions tend to show better quality. 
 
Contrary to ecosystem-level governance which uniformly applies to all participants, seeding as an 
indirect governance mechanism possesses more flexibility (Wareham et al. 2014; Huber 2018). Some 
major advantages include the possibility of phased implementation, quick reversal in the case of 
inadvertent side-effects, and easy duplication. One opportunity emerging from such flexibility is 
reinforced seeding, where platform owner financially sponsors the same complement more than once. 
Considering the different market competition before and after platform owners’ repeated investments, 
we also propose that: 
 
H (2): Complements that launch after the reinforced seeding only display better quality if the 
seeded complement has not monopolized the complementary market.  
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Research Data  
We use a dataset consisting of 499 connected home complements for Amazon’s Alexa platform. Alexa 
is an ideal research context for our purpose because all complements are closely centred around 
platform’s core product—Echo. Meanwhile, inside each complement there are sub-systems that may 
trigger multiple types of smart home services. Therefore, the research context serves our purposes to 
observe both external and internal complement’s coupling. Taking complement’s rating (continuous 
value from 1 to 5) as the dependent variable, the analysis also includes following variables to control 
the possible confounding effects:  
Regarding the features of the complements, we have Language which represents the number of 
languages supported by the complement. Origin which describes where the complement is developed, 
to recognize geographic differences on innovation capacity. Category where we manually reviewed and 
categorized all complements into 16 groups of smart home services (lightings, electronics, home 
security, air circulation, entertainment, utility monitor, thermostat, network, smart furniture, garage, 
irrigation, pet feeder, location track, cleaning, personal assistance, home integration). Characteristics of 
complement developers are also included: Complementor_Age measures the age of developer company 
or the length of activation of a developer individual. Complementor_Size define the complement to be 
Micro (1-10 employees), Small (11-50), Medium (51-200), and Large (over 201). Complementor_IPO 
distinguishes public from the private business to control for different financial strength.  
In addition, in Figure 1, the research proposes two more variables that describe the external and internal 
degree of coupling of each complement. External Coupling has two levels where ‘high’ means the 
complement is closely bounded with the platform’s core product (i.e. Echo). By contrast, ‘low’ means 
the complement is connected to Echo with another physical device (e.g. smart hub) in the middle as the 
integrator. The latter type of complements can easily adjust their internal coupling without 
reconfiguring the connection to Echo. In terms of the internal coupling, we categorize all complements 
into four groups based on the number and the variety of services they provide. 1) Pure Service Control 
where Echo is used for only dialogical services but not for operating any devices. 2) Device Control 
where Echo works as the terminal for controlling only or one type of devices. 3) Suite Control in which 
the complement is operating multiple devices from the same manufacturer. 4) Platform Control in 
which the complement is operating multiple devices from the different manufacturers.  
 
 
Figure 1. Illustration for complement’s external and internal coupling 
 
 
Preliminary findings 
The effect of seeding on complement quality  
We test H(1) which proposes that seeding can boost nascent platform’s complement quality by fitting 
Equation 1 using OLS regression: 
Qualityi = α + β1Afteri + β2Featurei + β3Couplingi + ϵi                                (1) 
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where Qualityi is the users’ rating score of complement i. Afteri is the treatment variable. It equals to 
1 if the complement i was launched after the seeding and equals to 0 if the complement existed before 
the seeding. 𝛽2 stands for several controls on the complement’s features such as language, region, and 
complementor’s age. 𝛽3  contains information regarding both the external and internal coupling of 
complement i. This equation is reflective to arguments on complement’s quality in Claussen et al. 
(2015), Tiwana (2018), and Cennamo et al. (2018). 
The results for Model (1) and (2) are presented in Table 1. In both models, we use platform’s financial 
investment on Ring Video Doorbell, and on Luma Wifi as the treatment event, respectively. The 
coefficients of After_seeding is the 𝛽1 in Equation 1. In the fitted model, 0.516 of 𝛽1 indicates that the 
complements launched after seeding generally receive point five higher customer rating score. The 
Model (2) also reveals the similar positive effect (0.525) at 5% significance level. By controlling 
complement’s features such as language and category, both models discovered that complements 
developed in North America and Europe perform better than complements from other regions. This 
could be attributed to the strong innovation capability enabled by IT and IP in the regions. Compared 
to micro businesses with less than 11 employees, large businesses show significantly lower advantages 
in contributing to high-quality complements. Lastly, Model (1) also indicates that the complements with 
complex internal coupling generally has better performance than pure service which has few internal 
couplings.  
These preliminary findings confirm the first assumption that seeding will incentivize complements that 
are launched later to show higher quality. The mechanisms through which seeding take effects could be 
racing activities among complementors, decreased market uncertainty of participation, and the enlarged 
consumer attention from the demand side.  
Reinforcement effect through repetitive seeding  
In this section, we examine whether repetitive seeding can further enhance the positive impact on 
improving complement quality. To study such a derivative of seeding strategy, we fitting Equation 2 
using OLS regression:  
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔2𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖          (2) 
The 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔1𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔2𝑖 is the interaction term which generated by multiplying two 
binary variables. As the result, it equals to YY if the complement launched after both seeding actions 
by the platforms; equals to YN if the complement launched only after the first seeding; and equals to 
NN if the complement is launched before the first seeding action. The interaction term 𝛽1 is our interest 
variable which examines whether the second seeding enhanced or diminished the strength of seeding’s 
quality improvement effect.  
The model (3) in Table 1 shows the results of analysing Amazon’s second seeding of Ring Video 
Doorbell. The significant positive coefficient of After_seeding 1 (0.528*) is consistent with our analysis 
on Equation 1. For the interaction term β1, the positive coefficient (0.686*) significant at 5% level 
confirms our assumption that the positive impact on complement quality will be enhanced if platform 
conducts repetitive seeding. Similarly, in model (4), we investigate Amazon’s second seeding on 
Ecobee Plus. The result does not reveal the significant impact of reinforced seeding. However, the 
complement’s region, complementor size, and the degree of internal and external coupling stay 
significantly influential to complement’s quality. 
To explain such inconsistency between two reinforcing seeding actions, we found two potential reasons. 
Firstly, founded in year 2012, the Ring Video Doorbell was in quite immature status when it received 
seeding from Amazon. By contrast, the Ecobee has been dominant in the thermostat market since 2008. 
Given the connected home as a nascent platform, the Ring Video Doorbell thus holds higher relevance 
to most of the participants. Secondly, the force of second seeding on Ring Video Doorbell is much 
stronger with Amazon’s full ownership on that complement. Rather than curbing innovation, it releases 
signal to other early stage businesses on the benefits of having a stronger presence on platform. 
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Table 1. OLS regression results on complement’s quality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Ring Luma Ring Ecobee Plus 
Specification OLS OLS OLS OLS 
After_seeding .516* 
(0.256) 
.525* 
(.244) 
  
After_seeding1 Only  
 
After_seeding1 * After_seeding2 
  .528* 
(.258) 
.686* 
(.337) 
.321 
(.213) 
.330 
(.370) 
Region     
North America .663* 
(.276) 
.665* 
(.277) 
.672* 
(.276) 
.668* 
(.275) 
Europe .725* 
(.294) 
.724* 
(.294) 
.722* 
(.294) 
.713* 
(.293) 
China -.272 
(.318) 
-.272 
(.318) 
-.277 
(.319) 
-.270 
(.317) 
Complementor_Size     
Small  .009 
(.181) 
.009 
(.181) 
.003 
(.181) 
.023 
(.181) 
Medium  -.275 
(.189) 
-.275 
(.188) 
-.277 
(.188) 
-.246 
(.188) 
Large -.481** 
(.187) 
-.475* 
(.186) 
-.485* 
(.187) 
-.455* 
(.187) 
Internal Coupling     
Platform control .446* 
(.224) 
.431 
(.225) 
.435 
(.225) 
.442* 
(.225) 
Suite control -.008 
(.162) 
-.019 
(.162) 
-.014 
(.163) 
-.020 
(.163) 
Service -.154 
(.304) 
-.157 
(.304) 
-.137 
(.303) 
-.139 
(.305) 
External Coupling (High) .288 
(.148) 
.286 
(1.49) 
.284 
(.150) 
.298* 
(.148) 
Complement’s feature control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons -34.342 
(42.210) 
-34.79 
(42.21) 
-30.14 
(43.04) 
-35.43 
(43.26) 
Obs 499 499 499 499 
Adj. R-squared 0.213 0.2131 0.2139 0.212 
F-test 10.80*** 10.91*** 9.6*** 10.34*** 
Notes. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 5%, 1%, 
0.1% levels, respectively.  
 
Contribution and follow up research 
In this study, we quantitatively investigate how nascent platforms could incentive better quality 
complements using a seeding mechanism. This research in progress aims to contribute to our 
understanding of platform strategy and platform governance from several perspectives. Firstly, the 
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research context highlights an emerging type of digital platform. Different from established digital 
platforms (e.g. iOS) which only has complements at the service layer, Alexa connected home enables 
more complexity regarding the internal coupling within the complement. Given the increasing 
popularity of IoT and robot technologies, and the resulting physical device complexity, the Alexa 
platform offers a promising setting to study forward-looking issues in platform economy. Secondly, 
responding to Stummer et al (2018), this research adopts quantitative methods which can offer robust 
empirical insights that contribute to the extant studies on platform strategy and governance.  
As a next step, we plan to improve both the rigor and scope of the findings. First, we plan to implement 
robustness checks on the preliminary findings by replacing customer rating score with other quality 
proxies. Such resources could include complements’ download or ratings in other app stores. Second, 
more data are needed to further exclude possible endogeneity issues in the analysis. For instance, 
updates on the development kits that Amazon provides to facilitate development of complements can 
influence complement performance. Lastly, the in-depth comparison could be done by using more 
statistical techniques. Specifically, we plan to investigate the effects of seeding by using the differences-
in-differences model in two different sub-categories of complements. 
To conclude, this research-in-progress paper reports preliminary findings on our study of platform 
seeding. The data tentatively confirms our hypothesis on the positive impact of seeding by incentivising 
better quality complements. By focusing on an emerging form of digital platform, the anticipated 
contribution will be relevant to platform strategy and platform governance. New insights on how a 
nascent platform can improve its complement quality are also likely to result in significant implications 
to practice.  
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